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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
Pre-Emption And Non-Regulation - The No Man's
Land Of Labor Relations
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board'
Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act2 the field of labor-management relations has been domi-
nated by Federal policy, the exclusiveness of which has
been made clear in Garner v. Teamsters Union' and Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.4 The States were left, for practical
and historical reasons, with power over breaches of the
peace, mass picketing,6 threats of violence 7 and violent
picketing amounting to torts under state law where no
adequate Federal remedy existed.8
However, the question had arisen under the Act whether
a State could act in a labor dispute where the N.L.R.B. did
not choose to act. In Bethlehem Co. v. State Board9 the
Supreme Court refused its blessing to the New York Labor
Board's certification of a foremen's union as a bargaining
agent where the national board's policy was not to grant
certification to such unions. It was held that the Federal
Act occupied the field, leaving no power to the State in a
matter covered by that Act and implied a lack of authority
in the national board to confer jurisdiction upon the State.
The Court expressly refused to pass on the question of
State action in cases where the N.L.R.B. declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction for budgetary or other reasons.
This decision led to the inclusion of a proviso to Section
10(a) in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act,10 which section expressly authorized
1353 U. S. 1 (1957).
249 Stat. 449, as amended 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. A. §151 et &eq. (1956).
8346 U. S. 485 (1953).
'348 U. S. 468 (1955).
aAuto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U. S. 266 (1956).
0Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942) ; Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
1 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc ... U. S ... , 78 S. Ct. 206 (1957). In Auto
Workers v. Wisconsin Board, supra, n. 4, 272, the Court remarked:
"No one suggests that violence is beyond State criminal power ...
The State interest in law and order precludes such interpretation...
Nor should the fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor practice
while engaging in violent conduct prevent States from taking steps
to stop the violence."
8 United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656 (1954).
9 330 U. S. 767 (1947).
10Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146, §10(a), 29 U. S. C. A.
§160(a) (1956) :
"... The Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases
in any industry . . . even though such cases may involve labor disputes
GUSS v. UTAH LABOR REL. BD.
cession of jurisdiction by the N.L.R.B. in certain cases,
under severely restrictive conditions.
The Board, while having full jurisdiction over the labor-
management relations which are the subject of the national
Act,11 has refused to exercise its power in many cases for
policy or budgetary reasons - usually where the impact
on interstate commerce was slight. These classes of cases
have since 1950 been governed by an N.L.R.B.-determined
set of jurisdictional standards based on annual dollar
amounts of interstate transactions made by the company
involved in the dispute. The standards were raised in 1954,
increasing the area of commerce wherein the Board would
refuse its services. 2 The question of what power, if any, a
declination of jurisdiction gave to the States was again
carefully avoided in Building Trades Council v. Kinard
Construction Co.'3
In a series of decisions handed down on March 25, 1957,
Section 10 (a) was held by the Supreme Court to be declara-
tive of Congressional intent to retain for itself the regula-
tion of labor relations affecting commerce, in spite of the
administrative incompleteness of this regulation. The fact
situations in these cases are roughly similar and are iden-
tical in the essential point discussed in this note.
In Guss v. Utah Labor Board,'4 unfair labor practices
were charged against the employer by the N.L.R.B. certified
bargaining agent. Between the certification and the filing
of the charge the N.L.R.B. raised its yardsticks so as to
exclude the employer's business from N.L.R.B. jurisdiction.
The complaint was refused by the N.L.R.B. since the opera-
tions involved were predominantly local in character and
it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise
jurisdiction. The unfair labor practices charged were
clearly within the provisions of the national Act. The union
then filed the same charges under the State Act with the
State Labor Board which found in the complainant's favor.
The State Board's remedial order was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Utah from which the appeal was taken.
affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial
statute... is Inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act
or has received a construction Inconsistent therewith."
See Labor Board v. Falnblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939), wherein the Act
was held to reach to the full extent of the Commerce clause.
12 Set forth in Breeding Transfer Company, 110 NLRB 493, 505 (1954)(Case No. 14-RC-2512).
'346 U. S. 933 (1954). It was not shown that the respondent applied to
the National Board, or that it would be futile to do so.14353 U. S. 1 (1957).
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In Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats,15 the N.L.R.B.'s aid
was not invoked but the employer's (complainant's) direct
interstate imports were but one-tenth of the Board's cur-
rent minimum standard and presumably the N.L.R.B.
would have refused to take jurisdiction. The employer
obtained a State Court injunction against the union's peace-
ful recognition picketing and the secondary pressures
exerted by the union. The injunction was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Ohio and the union took an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The third case, San Diego Unions v. Garmon,16 involved
peaceful picketing by an uncertified union to compel the
employer to grant a union shop contract. The N.L.R.B.,
under its monetary yardsticks, dismissed the employer's
petition for determination of the picketing union's right to
recognition as the employee's bargaining agent. The em-
ployer sued in a State court to enjoin the picketing on the
ground that he was being coerced into an 8 (a) (3)17 viola-
tion and in addition, sought damages resulting from the
picketing. Relief was granted on both counts and the
Supreme Court of California affirmed, holding that an un-
fair labor practice as defined by the national Act had no
privilege from State law in the absence of Federal exer-
cise of its jurisdiction.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Guss case,
and followed in the others cited, was briefly that 10(a) of
the national Act prescribed the exclusive means whereby a
State could be permitted to take jurisdiction of cases falling
within the substantive jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B., where
the latter for budgetary or policy reasons, refused to exer-
cise that jurisdiction. Section 10(a) required not only an
express cession of jurisdiction but also that the industry
involved be local in character, and, that the State law to
which the N.L.R.B. yields be consistent with Federal law,
either by express provision or by judicial interpretation. 8
Congress had shown its intention to require uniformity in
labor policy, even at the expense of leaving certain classes
of industry free of all regulation. The Court said:
1353 U. S. 20 (1957).
'353 U. S. 26 (1957).11L. M. R. A., supra, n. 9, 18(a)(3), 29 U. S. (. A. §158(a) (3) (1956):
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ... "
10 Supra, n. 10. In its brief as amlous ourfae in these cases, the N. L. R. B.
stated that it had not been able to make any cession agreements under the
proviso to 10(a) since no State statute met these conditions.
GUSS v. UTAH LABOR REL. BD.
"And here we find not only a general intent to pre-
empt the field but also the proviso to §10(a), with its
inescapable implication of exclusiveness.
"We are told by appellee that to deny the State
jurisdiction here will create a vast no-man's-land, sub-
ject to regulation by no agency or court. We are told
by appellant that to grant jurisdiction would produce
confusion and conflicts with federal policy. Unfortu-
nately, both may be right. We believe, however, that
Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uni-
formity. Since Congress' power in the area of com-
merce among the States is plenary, its judgment must
be respected whatever policy objections there may be
to creation of a no-man's land."19
The question left open in the Kinard" decision was thus
clearly and decisively answered. The Court suggested that
Congress may at any time relax its cession restrictions or
that the Board may reassert its full jurisdiction over labor
disputes affecting interstate commerce.21
The dissenting opinion of Justices Burton and Clark
pointed out that traditionally the States retained power to
act where Federal power lay dormant. Section 10(a) was
intended to provide for those situations where the national
Board for policy reasons determined that the State should
act in a particular case or class of cases. 22 However, mere
failure of the Board to act when it is forced to limit its
activities for budgetary reasons is not "cession" and Sec-
tion 10 (a) has no application. In the Bethlehem2 decision,
it was noted, the Court expressly refrained from deciding
the latter question.24
The scope of these decisions is apparent. The States are
excluded for all practical purposes, by this view of Section
10(a), from acting upon unfair labor practices in the "No
Man's Land", whether the action arises in a State court or
before a State labor board, and whether State or Federal
law is applied, eliminating as a result both judicial and
administrative power in the States except as to certain
types of tortious or criminal activities.2"
1 Supra, n. 14, 10-11.
10 Supra, n. 13.
Supra, n. 14, 11.
Ibid, dis. op. 12.
Bethlehem Co. v. State Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947).
Ibid, 776.
See cases, 8upra, ns. 5, 6, 7 and 8. The case, Laburnum, supra, n. 8,
involved a tort under State law.
19581
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The doctrine of pre-emption which was of such great
assistance in the expansion of Federal policy throughout
the area of labor relations (as well as in other areas) has
here resulted in the exclusion of Federal or any other labor
law or policy with regard to cases lying outside the adminis-
trative capabilities of the N.L.R.B. Amendment of the Taft-
Hartley Act is exceedingly difficult as a political reality,
since bills intended to amend the Act in one respect arouse
proposals from other sources to make more sweeping
changes.
Legislative proposals by Senators Ives26 and Watkins 2T
involve an express reversal of the doctrine of the Guss 2s
and its companion cases by authorizing the N.L.R.B. to
decline jurisdiction and expressly denying legislative intent
to exclude State power over these areas. The Smith bill,2"
which arose out of another application of the preemption
doctrine, destroys implied preemption itself by limiting the
exclusionary effect of Federal acts to those cases where the
statute expressly so states.
The Ives bill 30 has the additional feature of repealing the
restrictive conditions of 10(a). Since no State statutes
have yet met, nor are likely to meet, these conditions, it
would seem that elimination of the proviso to 10(a) is
essential to effective use of cession agreements.
The defect of these proposals is that they do not meet
the problem of uniformity in the regulation of labor rela-
tions in the field of interstate commerce.
Probably the solution lies in the reassertion by the
N.L.R.B. of its delegated jurisdiction over the entire field
of commerce.81 This would, of course, entail greater ex-
pense to the Federal government in the form of larger
N.L.R.B. budgets, as well as some reorganization of the
Board. Perhaps something similar to the Supreme Courts'
restriction of certiorari might evolve, thus making the
regional board's ruling administratively final, unless con-
flicts need resolution by the National Board.
CHARLES P. LOGAN, JR.
S. 1772, 85th Cong., 1st Session (1957).IS. 1723, 85th Cong., 1st Session (1957).
353 U. S. 1 (1957).
2 H. R. 3, 85th Cong., 1st Session (1957).
0 Supra, n. 26.
U See Office Employees v. Labor Board, 353 U. S. 313 (1957), where the
Court reversed a refusal of the N.L.R.B. to exercise jurisdiction on policy
grounds. It might be significant to note that in the Guss case the Court
was careful to state that it had not passed and was not passing on the
validity of any particular set of jurisdictional standards nor upon any
particular declination of jurisdiction by the N.L.R.B.
